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This paper explores a defining contradiction at the heart of the university as a social and cultural institution: society 
requires the university to serve it, but this service requires the university’s detachment and freedom from external 
social determinations. I argue that we can see this paradox embedded at the very heart of the university expressed in 
a myriad of ways throughout the institution’s long history, including the relatively recent debates about 
interdisciplinarity. I review some instances in the history of the university where this contradiction has expressed itself 
most clearly and then examine some of the ways in which the rubric “interdisciplinarity” has been deployed in the 
contemporary corporate university. How is the term used? Who uses it and for what reasons? How might we come to 
understand “interdisciplinarity” as a performative term re-presenting or promising one set of meanings, but 
instantiating a very different set of actions? What are the political dimensions of its use? I highlight and problematize 
the distinction between the emergence of “interdisciplinarity” as an intellectual phenomenon and “interdisciplinarity” 
as it is currently defined and administered within academic institutions. Finally, I explore an alternative way to think 





During more than eight centuries, ‘university’ has been the name given 
by a society to a sort of supplementary body that at one and the same 
time it wanted to project outside itself and to keep jealously to itself, to 
emancipate and to control . . . with the relative autonomy of a technical 
apparatus, indeed that of a machine and a prosthetic body, this artifact 
that is the university has reflected society only in giving it the chance for 
reflection, that is dissociation. (Derrida, 1983, p. 19) 
 
This quotation, taken from an essay by Jacques Derrida entitled “The Principle of Reason: The University 
in the Eyes of its Pupils,” signals a paradox at the heart of the university. Society demands the university 
to serve it, but this service requires the university’s detachment and freedom from external social 
determinations. The university enacts this paradox: requiring authorization from outside social agents 
(government, industry) in order to be free of them, and in order to reflect upon, criticize, or challenge 
them. This paradox, or conflict, embedded in the very idea of the university has been expressed and 
performed in a myriad of ways throughout the institution’s long history, and it can be found, once again, 
in the relatively recent debates about interdisciplinarity. 
In Outside the Lines: Issues in Interdisciplinary Research, Liora Salter and I identify a division in the 
literature about interdisciplinarity. One body of writing tends to define interdisciplinarity as any 




scholarly activity that works between disciplines to solve specifically defined social and technical 
problems. This brand of interdisciplinarity takes its impetus and instructions from beyond the walls of 
the academy, from the “real” world of industry and government. As such, we name it “instrumental” 
interdisciplinarity. The other broad area of writing on interdisciplinarity is primarily conceptual and 
focuses on the practice of interdisciplinarity as scholarly activity in and of itself. 
Under this rubric of “conceptual” interdisciplinarity, we make a further distinction. Some conceive 
interdisciplinary research as fundamentally dependent upon disciplinarity: “this perspective works to 
highlight the strengths of a disciplinary organization of knowledge and to suggest that those strengths 
may be extended into the development of new non- or interdisciplinary modes of knowledge seeking” 
(Salter & Hearn, 1996, p. 31). Another branch of conceptual interdisciplinarity sees it as a direct challenge 
to disciplinarity and to the established administration of knowledge. These challenges either search for a 
unified theory of knowledge or, more often, position interdisciplinarity as a process that renounces the 
reification of knowledge and education and stresses the integrative process of “becoming” individuals 
and communities. Embedded in these challenges is a critique of the dominant forms of institutionalized 
and administered knowledge.1 
Not surprisingly, the divisions Salter and I highlight between modes of interdisciplinarity re-iterate 
and re-inscribe the paradox at the heart of the university. In what follows, I further explore these 
divisions — between instrumental interdisciplinarity as a problem-based practice governed by 
determinants outside the walls of the university, and conceptual interdisciplinarity as embodying a 
challenge to the dominant disciplinary knowledge formations — in light of the university’s determining 
contradiction. I review some instances in the history of the university where this contradiction has 
expressed itself most clearly in order to set a context for the current debates about interdisciplinarity. In 
light of this history, I then examine some of the ways the rubric “interdisciplinarity” has been deployed in 
the contemporary corporate university, and I argue that “interdisciplinarity” has become a signal for the 
foreclosure of the university’s orienting paradox. How might we come to understand 
“interdisciplinarity” as a performative term, re-presenting or promising one set of meanings, but 
instantiating a very different set of actions? How is the term used? Who uses it and for what reasons? 
What are the political dimensions of its use? To answer these questions, I examine and problematize the 
distinction between the emergence of “interdisciplinarity” as an intellectual phenomenon and 
“interdisciplinarity” as it is currently defined and administered within academic institutions, and 
highlight the displacement of the first logic by the second. Finally, I gesture in the direction of an 
alternative way to think about what we do at the university in the name of interdisciplinarity. 
 
The Early Universities: Contested Terrain 
 
Since its earliest incarnations in the Middle Ages in Paris and Bologna, the meanings and functions of the 
university have been contested. In its very origins, the university embodied conflict between external 
interests — church, state, commerce — and internal radical opposition to these interests. This tension 
existed between the studia generalia — the free association of students and teachers that made up the 
earliest universities — and both the sites and contexts of their associations (towns and businesses) and the 
content of their study (vocational orientations such as law, medicine, and theology, which required 
external authorization). 
As Charles Homer Haskins pointed out, it is important to remember that, contrary to popular belief, 
the term “university” does not refer to a universality of knowledge, as some would expect, but, rather, to 
“the totality of a group, whether of barbers, carpenters, or students” (1957, p. 9). The first universitas of 
                                                 
1 For a full discussion of these distinctions, see especially “Interdisciplinarity” in Salter and Hearn (1996). 




students organized as a group in order to protect themselves from the price-gouging activities of the 
townspeople. These unions of students, once incorporated, found themselves able to make other kinds of 
demands, most notably of their teachers. In the southern universities of Italy, teachers were beholden to 
the fees students would pay per lecture and, as such, became subject to the universitas of students. 
Teachers then founded their own guilds, or colleges, “requiring for admission thereto certain 
qualifications, which were ascertained by examination” (Haskins, 1957, p. 11). The term “university,” 
then, refers to “nothing more than an entity that manages its own affairs and conducts business for itself” 
(Kane, 1999, p. 3). Initially, the term “university” was employed to describe various trade unions, but this 
usage was gradually discontinued. 
The first universities in Italy were student driven and vocationally oriented, defined by specific types 
of knowledge being taught in different regions: law in Bologna, medicine in Salerno. The model of the 
southern university emerged as the result of struggles between students, teachers, merchants, and city 
officials. But, notably, “the student guild immediately got the upper hand, and for several centuries 
effectively controlled the university. The students not the professors . . . elected from among their number 
the rectors or chief administrators, and students held the other administrative posts” (Cowley & 
Williams, 1991, pp. 44-45). 22  
In Northern Europe, however, the universities emerged out of struggles between teaching masters 
and the Church. Northern universities, such as the University of Paris, had their start as cathedral 
schools. The Bishop’s secretary, the Chancellor, hired Masters to teach and so initially controlled who and 
what was taught. All the Masters were clerics of the Church and could not deviate from teaching Church 
doctrine. They could, however, approve or disapprove students. In these first universities, the teachers 
had the upper hand over student guilds. The Chancellor also ran the lives of his students through the 
administration of Canon Law.  
The newly formed College of the Masters of Paris eventually contested the power of the Chancellor 
after a period of student riots and unrest. Some of these riots were precipitated by the radical teachings of 
scholars such as Peter Abelard, who dared to subject Church dogma to the formal structures of Greek 
reasoning. Teachers took to the streets, teaching in “ramshackle houses on the Petit-Pont that linked the 
island with the Left Bank of the Seine” (Kane, 1999, p. 8). Students turned away from the Chancellor’s 
university and “made up a student city in the middle of the city” (Kane, 1999, p. 9). The contestation of 
the power of the Church by the Masters of Paris ended in a royal charter and Papal Bull allowing the 
Masters to incorporate the university as an independent body with the power to elect its own Proctor to 
represent them to the King and the Church. In 1219, a Papal Bull was ordered dissolving the power of the 
Chancellor altogether (see Haskins, 1957; Kane, 1999). 
In its earliest incarnations, then, the university was a site of conflict and expressed its conflicted 
origins plainly. It was subject to external determining agents for its curriculum and its context (after all, 
these universities had no buildings but were dependent on private halls, churches, and the street) at the 
same time as it insisted on its independence in terms of internal institutional arrangements. Since this 
time, the university has remained both a site for radical social critique and a training ground for 
established professions, serving external dominant interests and, at the same time, staging opposition to 
those interests. 
We might reasonably argue that the university has never really seen harmony between its professed 
“ideals” and its practice — its orienting concepts of self-governance and selfdetermination and the 
administration or implementation of those concepts. The university, as a formal, administrated social 
institution, has always served the interests of those in power. The university, as an idea, process, or 
                                                 
2 For a detailed discussion of the history of student movements and student resistance, see Mark Edelman Boren 
(2001). 




experience, has tended to fight against those interests, insisting on its freedom. Debate, argumentation, 
and criticism remain enshrined as core values of university learning. 
 
Immanuel Kant and The Conflict of the Faculties 
 
This paradox of the university, expressed as a tension between academic freedom and instrumental or 
administered knowledge, appears again, famously, in Immanuel Kant’s The Conflict of the Faculties. 
Written in 1798, The Conflict of the Faculties was the last book Kant published; its three parts were not 
collected until after his death.3 He wrote the piece in response to the censorious measures against 
academic writing taken by the King of Prussia. In the essays, Kant performs a high-wire act for the King. 
He dutifully and repeatedly recognizes the university’s indebtedness to its political context and makes a 
case for the university as a site for social and government training and public service. At the same time, 
he argues for the university as a site for freedom of thought and inquiry. Kant attempts to defend both 
the academic freedom embodied by the lower faculty of philosophy and the “usefulness” of knowledge 
imparted by the higher faculties — law, medicine, and theology. 
The higher faculties of law, medicine, and theology have the job of caring for men’s civil, physical, 
and spiritual well-being and are under the necessary eye and sway of the government. The lower faculty 
of philosophy has the job of policing truth and illuminating reason. Kant sounds most conciliatory when 
he writes, “a faculty is considered higher only if its teachings . . . interest the government itself, while the 
faculty whose function is only to look after the interests of science is called lower because it may use its 
own judgment about what it teaches” (1972, pp. 25-27). With this model, Kant entrenches a view of the 
academy as simultaneously inside and outside the direct influence of external political or economic 
forces. But, perhaps more importantly, he re-states the paradox of the university through a discussion of 
the organization of the disciplines. His model admits to a necessary element of usefulness and 
instrumentality, at the same time as it advocates that thought and research be free from social and 
political pressures: 
 
It is absolutely essential that the learned community at the university 
also contain a faculty that is independent of the government’s command 
with regard to its teachings, one that, having no commands to give, is 
free to evaluate everything and concerns itself with the interests of . . . 
truth; one in which reason is authorized to speak out publicly. For 
without a faculty of this kind the truth would not come to light (and this 
would be to the government’s own detriment). (Kant, 1972, pp. 27-29) 
 
In the conflict that he names “an inevitable recurrence,” Kant sees “a necessity somehow 
transcendental and constitutive” (Derrida, 1992, p. 13), and so attempts to create a concrete strategy for its 
management and regulation. This is Kant’s “system of justification” (Derrida, 1992, p. 6) for the 
university, one that might successfully navigate its internally generated mission of reason and its 
externally authorized mission of usefulness. This system is based on the regulatory ideal of reason as 
final arbiter of action and thought. As Derrida has written, “Kantian thought tries to attain to pure 
legitimation, to purity of law, to reason as the court of last resort” (1992, p. 10). With Kant, reason is 
instituted as the “reason for” the university’s necessary autonomy and its exemplary role, and is 
structured in opposition to, or set apart from, the instrumental or technical ends of knowledge. 
                                                 
3 For a full discussion of the conflict surrounding The Conflict of the Faculties, see Mary Gregor’s “Translator’s 
Introduction” in Kant (1979). 




The “Useful” University and the Rise of Disciplinarity 
 
The central tension between the usefulness of the university for its society on the one hand and freedom 
of inquiry from external interests and the pursuit of reason on the other is in evidence again in the 
university reform movements of the nineteenth century. It is best exemplified in the establishment of the 
University of London in 1825 and in the reforms foisted upon Oxford and Cambridge a decade earlier. 
At this time, Oxford and Cambridge were taken to task, most notably by Adam Smith and Sydney 
Smith, for their exclusion of non-Church of England men, their apparently non-existent teaching 
practices, and their curriculum, which came under attack for its dreamy pursuit of “truth” and useless 
study of the classics. Adam Smith wrote, “in the university of Oxford, the greater part of the public 
professors have, for these many years, given up altogether even the pretence of teaching”(cited in Young, 
1992, p. 101). The Reverend Sydney Smith argued for the necessary usefulness of knowledge as against 
the uselessness of the kind of knowledge and learning offered at Oxford and Cambridge. In so doing, 
Smith instantiated a covert class politic into debates about higher education that continues to this day: 
 
what other measure is there of dignity in intellectual Labour, but 
usefulness? And what ought the term University to mean, but a place 
where every science is taught which is liberal, and at the same time 
useful to mankind. Nothing would so much tend to bring classical 
literature within proper bounds, as a steady and invariable appeal to 
utility in our appreciation of all human knowledge. (Smith, extracted in 
Sanderson, 1975, pp. 35-36) 
 
The Dons at Oxford and Cambridge responded to these criticisms, arguing for the pursuit of useless 
knowledge. They linked the pursuit of high truth with spiritual practice and with the Church, and pitted 
the standard of “quality of mind” against a debased and vulgar notion of direct utility. Edward 
Copleston, provost of Oriel College, responded to Smith: 
 
to make necessity the standard of what is praiseworthy or honourable is 
against the uniform judgment of mankind. There must be surely a 
cultivation of mind, which is itself, a good: a good of the highest order; 
without any immediate reference to bodily appetites, or wants of any 
kind. . . . The habit of discrimination, the power of stating a question 
distinctly and of arguing with perspicuity are of much greater 
importance than the hasty acquisition of miscellaneous knowledge. 
(extracted in Sanderson, 1975, pp. 37-38) 
 
The founding of the University of London in 1826 broke the Church’s monopoly of higher education 
and entrenched the arguments for socially useful education articulated by Sydney Smith and Adam 
Smith, among others. The informing spirit of the University of London was the work of Jeremy Bentham, 
especially his notion of “chrestomathia,” meaning “conducive to useful learning” (Young, 1992, p. 105). 
This was a theory of pedagogy based on the qualities of efficiency and discipline. Bentham proposed 
 
a new system of instruction . . . based on the latest theories of 
associationist psychology, together with the abolition of flogging, [and] 
the admission of girls on an equal basis with boys (a principle that the 
University of London itself did not endorse until 1878). . . . The school 




itself was built as a panopticon, so as to allow the most efficient use of 
the teacher’s capacities. (Young, 1992, pp. 104-105) 
 
The University of London, along with the reformed German and American universities, offered a 
comprehensive range of useful subjects — medicine, engineering, mathematics, political economy, law — 
and focused, purposefully, on the utility of research and knowledge for outside interest.4 These 
universities embodied in concrete form a politicized alternative to the class-based practices of open 
inquiry and “useless” literary education offered at Oxford and Cambridge. 
During this time of university reform in the mid-nineteenth century, the disciplinary structure with 
which we are now so familiar became entrenched. These disciplinary structures of knowledge and 
teaching were clearly conditioned by outside interests: economic, cultural, and political. The rise of 
industrialization and technology, the growth of the natural and social sciences, and the rise of a 
professional bourgeois class, for example, not only helped to determine the structure and delineation of 
the disciplines, but also permeated the administrative structures and ideologies of the university itself. 
New modes of inquiry, psychiatry, evolutionary biology, and sociology articulated what Foucault (1982) 
termed the “dividing practices” demanded by the “useful” university. Faculties competed against each 
other for internal and external funding and recognition. Thus, they came to function in relative isolation 
from each other. Bentham’s model of education as panopticon set into motion a practice of disciplinarity 
as a “distinct form of power which trains the body and soul, by systematically observing and 
distinguishing its subjects” (Messer-Davidow & Shumway, 1991, p. 212). 
We can see in the emergence of the useful disciplinary university a concomitant movement toward 
social conformity and political docility. Although in its earliest expression the useful university was 
intended to democratize education, the structural formulas for disciplinary efficiency worked instead to 
generate useful and productive social subjects. As Michel Foucault argues, disciplinary power 
 
refers individual actions to a whole that is at once a field of comparison, 
a space of differentiation and the principle of the rule to be followed. It 
differentiates individuals from one another. . . . It measures in 
quantitative terms and hierarchizes in terms of value the abilities, the 
level, and the nature of individuals. It introduces through this value 
giving measure, the constraint of conformity to be achieved. . . . [I]t 
traces the limit that will define difference in relation to all other 
differences, the external frontier of the abnormal. (1977, pp. 182-183) 
 
The discourses of university disciplinarity as we understand them today emerged at the same time as 
industrialization and the entrenchment of market logic: 
 
The combination of social and institutional bureaucratization, demands 
for efficient professionals, and the idealization of professorial virtuosi led 
to the further entrenchment of disciplinary specialization. These 
institutional and social dynamics have continued to this day, ensuring 
the maintenance and hegemony of disciplinary research and education. 
(Salter & Hearn, 1996, p. 20) 
 
 
                                                 
4 For a full account of the funding of the University of London, see Sanderson (1975). 




The Rise of Interdisciplinarity  
 
We might see the rise of interdisciplinarity in the early part of the twentieth century in the tradition of the 
students of Bologna, the Masters of the University of Paris, and the Dons of Oxford and Cambridge. We 
might see it as yet another attempt to assert the necessary freedom of knowledge and inquiry against the 
exigencies and external pressures of society and entrenched modes of administered knowledge. But we 
might also see it as yet another expression of the contradiction and conflict embedded in the idea of the 
university. Interdisciplinarity in its first historical expression after World War I was explicitly 
counterdisciplinary and was interested in university reform. The focus at this time was on integrative 
knowledge, as evidenced in the unity of science movement. These challenges — what we have called 
“critical interdisciplinarity” — continue today in the form of area studies, women’s studies, queer studies, 
post-colonial studies, race studies, and cultural studies, to name a few. These modes of knowledge cut 
across traditional institutional and administrative boundaries at the same time as they question 
traditional ways of knowing and learning.5 
Predictably, just as discourses about critical interdisciplinarity developed within the academy, 
external social and political demands (most notably the Second World War) called for the development of 
problem-focused, instrumental interdisciplinary research. As the humanities and social sciences 
continued their critique and challenge to established forms of knowledge and modes of knowing, 
keeping alive some notion of a “lower faculty” within the university, problem-focused interdisciplinarity 
was deployed to address political and social issues defined and delineated by external agents. And so, we 
return to the distinction between problem-focused interdisciplinarity and conceptually based 
interdisciplinarity.  
This brief review of some defining moments in the history of the university illustrates some of the 
ways in which the university’s paradox has been articulated and played out. We might argue that the 
difficulties we currently face in the modern university are shaped and conditioned by this same paradox 
or contradiction. Clearly, our understanding of current debates and issues inside the university may be 
enriched by an appreciation of the paradoxical nature of the university and of the ways in which this 
paradox has been negotiated throughout the university’s history.  
The numerous crises facing the university today — debates around the impact of external corporate 
interests and funding on academic freedom; debates about the role of “new learning” technologies; 
debates about the impoverishment of public education; debates concerning the disciplinary “rigour” of 
the humanities in the face of the “cultural turn” of the 1990s, better known as the “culture wars”; and, of 
course, debates about the legitimacy and content of interdisciplinary research — all betray a 
determination to define, once and for all, the university’s nature and mission. These debates drive to 
resolution and usually articulate, in some form or other, one side or another of the paradox outlined 
above: utility vs. uselessness; pragmatic, skill-based education vs. the pursuit of learning for learning’s 
sake. But where does interdisciplinarity sit inside the conflicted site of the university? Is 
“interdisciplinarity” exemplary of the university’s animating paradox? Or, is it, in effect, working to 
nullify or cripple it? What can current incarnations of interdisciplinarity tell us about the relative health 





                                                 
5 For a complete accounting of the history of modern interdisciplinary institutional formations, see Julie Thompson 
Klein (1990). 




Interdisciplinarity Today: Success or Failure?  
 
Almost ten years after the publication of Outside the Lines, it might reasonably be argued that the 
movement for critical interdisciplinary work has been successful. It appears as though traditional 
structures of disciplines and faculties are dissolving. We have seen the unprecedented growth of area 
studies and the growing dominance of cultural studies as an orientation for politicized learning across the 
social sciences and humanities. Modes of knowledge formation and the hierarchy of the disciplines, as 
they have been understood for well over one hundred years, are breaking apart (Klein, 1990, 1993; 
Readings, 1996). Traditional forms of knowledge are being rationalized out of existence in the name of 
what once were powerfully anti-institutional forces, such as cultural studies.6  
But, as Bill Readings has famously written, the move to institutionalize cultural studies and other 
types of “area studies” (along lines of gender, race, and sexuality, for example) must be understood in 
broader social and political context:  
 
the idea of cultural studies arises at the point when the notion of culture 
ceases to mean anything vital for the university as a whole. The human 
sciences can do what they like with culture, can do cultural studies, 
because culture no longer matters as an idea for the institution. (1996, p. 
91)  
 
In other words, the “engaged politics” articulated inside cultural studies, gender studies, or race studies 
can be reasonably indulged by the modern corporate university. Cultural studies or gender studies can 
serve as the ultimate interdisciplinary models in the corporate university; critics can continue to lace 
together theories of representation, identity, and ideology, and can expect to be institutionally indulged 
because, simply, “the high stakes game has moved to another table” (Readings, 1996, p. 104). In this age 
of the transnational corporate university, the real action, internally, is in the areas of science and 
technology and is driven, externally, by the rhetoric and “best-practices” of for-profit corporatism. Given 
these claims, one might reasonably ask: have critical interdisciplinarians simply been flattered into a 
sense of “success” due to their growing institutional recognition? Can critical sensibilities be so easily 
bought off?  
Critical interdisciplinarians may have argued for the dissolution of traditional administrative 
structures, but this deconstruction failed to provide a sufficient understanding of the recuperative power 
of administered market logic. This bureaucratic logic rushed in to fill the void left by traditional 
incarnations of the university. Today’s useful university is the bureaucratic university, “an autonomous 
bureaucratic corporation whose internal regulation is entirely self-interested without regard to wider 
ideological imperatives” (Readings, 1996, p. 40). The modern corporate university is a social site that 
reproduces without question the values and tenets of capitalism. It not only mimics the structures, 
behaviours, and values of private industry, but also has, in fact, become such an entity itself (Press & 
Washburn, 2000). “The university is bowing more and more to corporate values . . . [and] accountability 
has indeed been co-opted into accounting — empty chatter about excellence evades fundamental 
questions of value while disguising narrow and brutal conceptions of cost and benefit” (Harvey, 1998, pp. 
115 - 116).  
The corporatization of the university is evidenced in Canada and around the world in any number of 
ways: private funding of research (over 4.25 billion corporate dollars were donated to universities in the 
                                                 
6 For examples of the growing hegemony of cultural studies, see Cary Nelson (1994) and Anthony Easthope (1991). 
For a discussion of the impact of trends in cultural theory and the rise of cultural studies on traditional humanist 
disciplines, see Good (2001). 




U.S. in 1995); “strategic partnerships” with industries; corporate sponsorship on campus through 
scholarships, on-campus advertising, and sports team endorsements; endowed chairs; the 
implementation of key performance indicators by governments based solely on (any) job acquisition after 
graduation; the growth of professor-entrepreneurs; the development of new media technology and 
learning programs in partnership with private technology interests; and the proliferation of “technology 
transfer” and “patent development” offices in university administrations.7 In Canada, increasingly, 
topdown corporate models of governance are replacing bicameral university governance structures, and 
faculty and students are increasingly marginalized in decision-making processes.8 Perhaps the most 
telling evidence of the hegemony of the corporate university is the fact that administration was  
 
the leading growth sector of higher education . . . in more than 3,000 U.S. 
colleges and universities from 1985 to 1990. While the number of full-
time faculty grew by only 8.6 percent, administrative personnel rose by 
14.1 percent, and their subordinates, “other professionals,” increased by 
double that, or 28.1 percent. (Engell & Dangerfield, 1998, p. 5)  
 
In light of the growth of external corporate interests on campus, one might reasonably ask what role 
has instrumental interdisciplinarity played in this development? Has instrumental interdisciplinarity 
served to legitimate and indeed bolster the interests of private corporate interests on campus? Problem-
focused, or instrumental, interdisciplinary research is particularly vulnerable to the external logic of 
corporate interests as it can leave unexamined the assumptions behind the delineation of “problems” to 
be studied, the sources of its funding, and the social, political, and economic implications of the 
“solutions” it offers. Here, we can see how the rubric of “interdisciplinarity” functions as a kind of Trojan 
horse, smuggling external political and economic interests inside the walls of the academy. And so, 
“interdisciplinarity” becomes a sign or a code word. Cloaked in the rhetoric of academic freedom and 
innovation, “interdisciplinarity” can serve as a rationale and as a source of legitimation for private 
interests and corporate-style institutional arrangements inside the academy.9 Academic administrators 
love to feel as though they are on the cutting edge. The use of the term “interdisciplinarity” in grant 
applications and funding proposals works to assure them they are. With this term, they are able to signal 
one meaning — free academic innovation in knowledge formation — and execute another — an uncritical 
capitulation to agendas and problems determined by government and corporate interests.  
 
Countering the Corporate University?  
 
I see our current circumstances, in the throes of the transnational corporate university, as dire. The 
paradox of the university — its tradition of conflict and debate — is being foreclosed. I would like to 
heighten the sense of urgency some of us may feel about the current state of the university, about the 
paradigms we are losing and the ones we are purportedly “gaining” — those foisted upon us by external 
corporate logic. Most significantly, I would like to ask how have both critical and instrumental 
interdisciplinarity worked, perhaps unknowingly, to produce or allow for the current state of the 
corporate university? In the wake of the “postmodern turn” in the humanities and the social sciences, do 
                                                 
7 See Press and Washburn (2000); Engell and Dangerfield (1998); Harvey (1998); Readings (1996); Poovey (2001); 
and Theall (2000) on the corporate university. 
8 See especially Booth (2001), Quigley (2003), and Hearn (2002b). 
9 Press and Washburn (2000) outline specific examples of the ways in which private interests control and direct 
research agendas. They highlight how researchers are "gently persuaded" to abandon claims to academic freedom in 
the name of "useful" research. 




we need to re-instantiate a “subject” behind the object of a university education? Are the rhetoric and 
rationale of corporate interests expressed as “practice-oriented education” now all there is to see in 
university administration and curriculum? Has the university lost its “lower faculty”? Gregg Lambert 
argues that there is a  
 
fundamental problem in the architecture of the contemporary university, 
a failure in the discourse of sufficient grounds or principles, perhaps a 
foundational weakness caused by the absence of a faculty whose 
juridical task was to protect the ends of the university from being 
reduced to purely finite, economic, politico-ideological, and culturally 
determined forms of interests. (1997, n. p.)  
 
How can we prevent the university from being reduced to its pure utility for capital, from becoming 
a purely functional apparatus? How can we prevent the foreclosure of debate and conflict about and 
around the site of university? Can the humanities and their current interdisciplinary inflections re-
incarnate Kant’s ideal of the “lower faculty”? Can they actively work to re-assess their responsibility to 
think through the idea of the university and its structures?  
Mary Poovey, from within the post-modern cultural turn, argues for the strategic essentializing of the 
idea of the “human” in order to counteract the thorough penetration of market logic into the university. 
She writes, “The only way we can evaluate the effects of market penetration into the university in terms 
other than the market’s own is to assert some basis for evaluation that repudiates market logic and 
refuses market language” (2000, p. 9). Tellingly, Poovey argues that the basis for this alternative rhetoric 
must be the “goods of living culture, which embody and preserve human creativity” (2000, p. 9).  
This argument resonates with older university debates, as the humanities are called upon to fulfill the 
role of Kant’s lower faculty. The humanities must “preserve, nurture, analyze, interrogate, and interpret 
this living body of cultural materials” (Poovey, 2000, p. 10) as a defense against the assimilating forces of 
external social pressures. This sentiment is echoed in much current work by humanists who assert the 
usefulness of useless knowledge (Engell & Dangerfield, 1998; Good, 2001; Kermode, 1997). Engell and 
Dangerfield bring the words of Edward Copleston, Provost of Oriel College, to mind when they write in 
Harvard Magazine:  
 
Do we care anymore whether colleges and universities are custodians of 
collective, diverse cultures — whether they record, teach, transmit 
traditions and give us the linguistic and symbolic tools to express our 
veneration, criticism and contribution to our culture, to make 
connections within its variety, to examine its checkered past and to 
imagine its possible future? (1998, p. 8)  
 
But, can a facile redeployment of these older justifications for the university as bearer of culture 
effectively work against the logic of the corporate university? To what degree do these justifications 
simply replay turf wars between the disciplines, leaving the larger question of the nature of the place, its 
regulatory ideal of reason, its moral imperative, and our responsibility to it untouched? What role can 
“interdisciplinarity” play in the fight to resist the paradigms of instrumental knowledge production and 
administration we have “gained” in the last decades and reinvigorate debate about the nature of the 
university itself?  
 
 




Revisiting Interdisciplinarity  
 
An institution — this is not merely a few walls or some outer structures 
surrounding, protecting, guaranteeing, or restricting the freedom of our 
work; it is also and already the structure of our interpretation. (Derrida, 
1992, p. 22)  
 
Is interdisciplinarity working to shore up the interests of university administrators and their private 
partners? Is it working to placate the interests of those “radical” thinkers who wish to carve out academic 
ground and legitimacy for themselves and their interests? Is what happens under the name of 
“interdisciplinarity” actually working to open up spaces for challenge and dissent — holding open a 
space for new thought?  
In Outside the Lines, we describe interdisciplinarity as “any challenge to the limitations or premises of 
the prevailing organization of knowledge or its representation in an institutionally recognized form” (Salter & 
Hearn, 1996, p. 43). But we must remember that this description itself is as much a political position, and 
a structure of interpretation, as it is any objective measure of the academic landscape out there. I argue 
that we must work to inflect the term in such a way that it can be made to keep alive the traditions of 
debate and contestation at the heart of the university.  
“Interdisciplinarity” must be both an intellectual and an overtly political endeavour, involving a 
rigorous process of self-reflexive analysis beyond issues of representation and into the terrain of the 
political economy of knowledge production. As Derrida writes in his essay “Mochlos,”  
 
I do not know if there exists today a pure concept of a university 
responsibility. . . But today the minimal and in any case the most 
interesting, most novel and strongest responsibility, for someone 
attached to a research or teaching institution, is perhaps to make this 
political implication, its system and its aporias as clear and thematic as 
possible. (Derrida, 1992, p. 22)  
 
In light of this, we must ask how might we best deploy and enact interdisciplinarity now?  
 
Clearly, the challenge is to fight the foreclosure of the university’s meaning by market logic and to 
hold open spaces for thinking, developing, and teaching alternative values, as a way of at least 
maintaining the paradox of the place. I propose that one of the ways in which this might be done is to link 
the intellectual work of interdisciplinarity with the generation of new forms of community inside and 
outside the walls of universities. In other words, we need to consciously link together intellectual 
interdisciplinarity and the act of imagining new forms of university administration and 
institutionalization, imagining new communities to be formed and new ways of forming them within and 
against the “ruins” of the university. These new communities would necessarily be involved in ongoing 
efforts to describe and re-describe the university as a social, cultural, and political site, at the same time as 
they pursue other knowledge ends. As Bill Readings writes, “dwelling in the ruins of the University thus 
means giving a serious attention to the present complexity of its space, undertaking an endless 
détournement of the spaces willed to us by a history whose temporality we no longer inhabit” (1996, p. 
129).  
We have seen how “interdisciplinarity” bears the marks of the university’s central and defining 
tensions. Just as interdisciplinary work can challenge and break apart entrenched knowledge formations, 
it can also provide the ground for new knowledge communities. These communities might be 




provisional. They will inevitably shift and change. They might be defined by the pursuit of specific kinds 
of knowledge, but they might also be defined by concrete attempts to challenge the current institutional 
incorporation of the university itself via new modes of governance, methods of consultation, and funding 
practices. Indeed, they might work beyond disciplinary structures altogether.  
 
Towards Extra-disciplinarity: An Example of a New Learning Community  
 
Such a community would interrogate the essence of reason and of the 
principle of reason, the values of the basic, of the principal, of radicality . 
. . and it would attempt to draw out all the possible consequences of this 
questioning. . . .What is meant by community and institution must be 
rethought. (Derrida, 1983, p. 16) 
 
Recently, at Trent University, in the face of administrative adversity, a solid student-led subculture 
emerged which combined direct political action with theoretical analysis and the development of new 
cross-disciplinary interests. Students, along with faculty from across disciplines, formed a distinct 
learning community, derived not from the classroom, but from the political fight for the soul of Trent and 
the idea of the university itself. This struggle against privatization and corporate modes of university 
governance resulted in the formation of several reading groups and courses, teach-ins, conferences, an art 
show, films, newspaper and journal articles, and the integration of several sympathetic community 
groups (townies) in Peterborough with the student groups. One might call such a phenomenon “extra-
disciplinary” in the sense that most of the learning and research occurred outside of the classroom and 
across disciplinary structures of the university. As Derrida has written, given the paradox of the place, 
the responsibilities of and to the university can never be purely academic: “The decision of thought 
cannot be an intra-institutional event, an academic moment” (Derrida, 1983, p. 19).  
The events at Trent recall the first moments of the university in Italy — for the most part, student-led 
and student-defined. At Trent and indeed at many other universities across the globe (most notably in the 
300-day-long student strike at UNAM in Mexico City and, surprisingly, at Harvard in Boston), students 
formed their own “university,” within and against the demands of external political and administrative 
agents. In these moments, the university finds itself re-imagined, simultaneously speaking to itself and 
beyond itself: postadministration, post-classroom, and post-theory. The university becomes a staging 
ground for meaningful social participation and political change.  
Bill Readings argues that the university community is necessarily a dissensual one. As we have seen, 
dialogue, dissent, and debate are part of its very lifeblood: “The university is a place where thought takes 
place beside thought, where thinking is a shared process without identity or unity. Thought beside itself 
perhaps” (1996, p. 192). From its earliest incarnations, the unique social space of the university has always 
attempted to enact a very simple idea: we should learn and think together. At its core is a notion of 
community and of communication that is generated both inside and, necessarily, beyond the walls of the 
place. Real learning built out of dialogue is necessarily open-ended, exploratory, and self-referential. The 
university community is, as a result, always in the process of “becoming,” constituting itself every time it 
tries to define itself, again within and against its social context. Every time we ask what a university is, 
“we are making a claim about its future, namely, that it is not complete” (Bobette, 2001, p. 3).  
The role of interdisciplinarity, as I see it, is to work towards substantiating this claim. 
Interdisciplinarity as a practice and a concept needs to remember and preserve the idea of conflict and 
debate embedded as a core value of the university. This understanding must become part of the structure 
of our interpretation of the place and the process. Under the rubric of interdisciplinarity, and against the 
foreclosure of corporate logic around the meanings of the university today, we must commit ourselves to 




new formations of knowledge and inquiry and, simultaneously, to the constitution of new learning 
communities, however provisional and tentative. Interdisciplinarity should give expression to a modality 
of scholarly activity that works self-consciously and responsibly to hold open both an intellectual and an 
administrative space where one remains free to ask and fruitfully pursue the question “what is a 
university?” 
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